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Logicians cannot make sense of science-but they can make sense of logic
and so they stipulate that science must be presented in terms of their favorite logical system. This would be excellent comedy material were it not
the case that by now almost everyone has started taking the logician seriously.'

Orthodox neoclassical economists as well cannot make sense of economics, but they too can make sense of logic and so they stipulate that
economics must be presented in terms of their favorite logical system
-logical empiricism-and therein lies one of the fundamental stumbling blocks to progress within the discipline of economics. The neoclassical paradigm that now dominates the profession is purportedly
based upon a methodological foundation of logical empiricism, which
the neoclassical economists themselves cannot conform to, but which
nonetheless has proven to be quite useful in undercutting the legitimacy
of those alternative research programs that do not support the ideological conclusions of neoclassicism. One such alternative research proThe authors are, respectively, Assistant Professor of Economics, University of NebraskaLincoln, and graduate student, University of Tennessee, Knoxville. They would like to
thank Greg Hayden for his helpful comments on an earlier draft. This article waspresented
at a joint session of the Association for Evolutionary Economics and the Association for
Social Economics, Chicago, Illinois, 28 December 1987.
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gram, neoinstitutional economics, has been conveniently dismissed as
illegitimate because it is not "scientific"; that is, it does not conform to
the rigorous demands of logical empiricism.
Although neoclassical economics does not meet the requirements of
its own methodological precepts, our purpose is not to dwell on the
inadequacies of the neoclassical paradigm or to discuss the substance
of neoinstitutional thought. Rather, our purpose is to clarify the methodological foundations of neoinstitutional thought and to argue that
neoinstitutional economics represents a legitimate research program
that is, by virtue of its methodology, more consistent with recent developments in the philosophy of science.
The Positivist Tradition and Neoclassical Economics

The philosophy of science in the twentieth century has encompassed
the rise of logical positivism, its maturation in logical empiricism, and
a fundamental attack thereon through the growth of knowledge tradition of Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, and others.* Logical empiricism grew in the 1940s and 1950s out of the tradition of logical
positivism, which argued that science progresses through the application of logical analysis to empirical phenomena. In constructing scientific theories, only those statements that can be verified-that is,
empirically observed-are accepted as meaningful statements in a theory. Logical empiricism evolved within this tradition in an effort to
explicate the derivation of meaningful (verifiable) sentences for theory
construction. When the prescription that every meaningful sentence of
a theory be verifiable became too confining, the "emphasis shifted from
the demarcation of scientific from nonscientific statements to the evaluation of competing theories."3 The evaluation of theories rested upon
a determination of the correspondence between theory claims and reality.
It is not difficult to demonstrate that neoclassicism does not conform
to the methodological precepts of logical empiricism. Take, for example, the development of consumer theory in neoclassical theory. Consumer theory developed as a theory of choice whereby individuals
maximize utility, subject to constraints. Because utility cannot be observed directly, Paul Samuelson set out to reconstruct consumer theory
using only observational concept^.^ The resulting theory of revealed
preference, as Stanley Wong has demonstrated, is based upon unrestricted universal sentences, contains non-observational terms, and,
most importantly, derives conclusions that are n o n - o b s e ~ a b l e . ~
The problem facing neoclassicism is, however, more serious than the

Philosophy of Science and Neoinstitutional Thought

399

failure of Samuelson to derive an observational equivalent to ordinal
utility theory. The fundamental problem for neoclassicism is that the
maximization hypothesis, while untestable, remains at the core of the
neoclassical research program and makes the hypotheses of neoclassicism nonrefutable. The logical positivist shift in emphasis away from
the testability of individual sentences to evaluation of the empirical
content of theories is meaningless when the theory is based upon something as unamenable to definition as the maximization hypothesis. One
would have to agree with Mark Blaug that much of the empirical work
in economics is like "playing tennis with the net down," and produces
what Blaug has called "innocuous falsifi~ationism."~
While one can quite easily argue that the religious-like devotion of
neoclassical economists to positivism is anything but innocuous, this
devotion is all the more striking when we consider that positivism has
been in decline for more than twenty years within the philosophy of
science. The attack on the positivist tradition accelerated in the 1960s
with the criticism of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. The criticisms of post-positivists such as Kuhn and Feyerabend concurrently
form the underlying foundation of the growth of knowledge tradition.
Three aspects of the growth of knowledge tradition are examined
here: the emphasis on specificity over universality, the interactionist
view, and the rejection of the normative-positive dichotomy. This tradition, it will be shown, has much in common with the epistemological
foundations of neoinstitutional thought.
Post-Positivism and the Critique of Logical Empiricism

A fundamental aspect of the growth of knowledge tradition has been
a recognition of the historical nature of inquiry and hence an emphasis
on specificity over universality within the philosophy of science. According to Bruce Caldwell, "logical empiricists concerned themselves
with the elaboration of universal models and procedural rules which
they believed aptly characterized legitimate scientific practice."' As
Feyerabend describes the process, the aim of positivists such as Karl
Popper is to "develop a special point of view, to bring that point into
logically acceptable form . . . and then to discuss everything in its
term^."^ In contrast, post-positivists such as Kuhn and Feyerabend are
united in stressing the inseparability of the historical context of inquiry
and the context of justification. "According to Kuhn science is a historical tradition . . . it is not subjected to external rules, the rules that
guide the scientist are not always known, and they change from one
period to the next."9 Post-positivists are less concerned with developing
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a universal "scientific method" and more concerned with "the growth
of knowledge over time, the dynamics of change within individual disciplines and the actual practices of scientists."1° By stressing the historical aspect of inquiry, post-positivists minimize the prescriptive role of
philosophy of science and, by acknowledgingthe heterogeneous process
of inquiry, advocate methodological pluralism.
A second and related aspect of the post-positivist tradition concerns
the "interactionist view" of science.'' The interactionist view of science
concerns the relationship between the scientist qua investigator and the
objective "fact" awaiting explanation. Instead of accepting as given the
notion of an "objective" scientist merely evaluating empirical data,
post-positivists emphasize the interaction of the scientist and the problem awaiting empirical examination. According to Feyerabend, science
combines reason and practice. Logical analysis "serves as a guide who
is part of the activity guided and is changed by it."'* The interactionist
view of science essentially views science as a problem-solving activity
directed not by reason alone, but by the interaction of reason and practice.
Perhaps the most devastating aspect of the post-positivists' critique
of logical empiricism has been their analysis of the normative-positive
dichotomy. This distinction between normative and positive has been
attacked by the post-positivists at several points within the philosophy
of science.
First, facts do not exist independently of scientific theories; what is
construed as a fact depends upon one's theoretical framework. "What
confronts the observer is usually a choice of fact. Events have a way of
outstripping observations and there is a richness to existence that compels a selection."13 Thus the "subjective" perspective of the scientist
influences the collection of the "objective" data. "On closer analysis we
even find that science knows no 'bare facts' at all but that the 'facts'
that enter our knowledge are already viewed in a certain way and are,
therefore, essentially ideational."14
Furthermore, having chosen the "facts" to consider, observation of
the facts also involves subjective perception. As Norwood Hanson
points out: "In Kohler's famous drawing of the Goblet-and-faces we
'take' the same retinal/cortical/sense-datum picture of the configuration; our drawings might be indistinguishable. I see a goblet however,
and you see two men staring at one another. Do we see the same thing?
Of course we do. But then again we do not."15
For Kuhn, the subjective emphasis is not so much on perception as
on interpretation, for "interpretation begins where perception ends.
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The two processes are not the same, and what perception leaves for
interpretation to complete depends drastically on the nature and
amount of prior experience and training."16
It is clear from the above discussion that the normative-positive distinction represents a false dichotomy. Through selection, perception,
and interpretation, "objective facts" reflect subjective judgments. The
post-positivist distinction incorrectly divorces fact from value and subject from object. The criticisms of positivism embodied in the growth
of knowledge tradition have been sufficiently effective to relegate the
methodology of positivism and the positivist tradition to the archives
of intellectual history.17 Moreover, the growth of knowledge tradition
exposes the weaknesses of the Cartesian system that underlies positivism and its forced separation of fact and value, normative and positive.
In recent decades, the philosophy of science has moved away from the
Cartesian tradition toward an integration of fact and value. Similarly,
neoinstitutionalists, through their methodological forbearers, the
American pragmatists, have also sought to integrate fact and value.
Post-PositivistsAspects of Neoinstitutional Thought

Neoinstitutional thought combines the instrumental logic of John
Dewey and the social value theory of Clarence Ayres, J. Fagg Foster,
and Marc Tool.18 Although the epistemological foundation of neoinstitutional thought was developed by Dewey more than fifty years ago, it
has much in common with the growth of knowledge tradition within
the philosophy of science.
John Dewey viewed the process of inquiry as a distinctly historical
process, not unlike Kuhn and Feyerabend. For Dewey, science was
what scientists were doing as opposed to what philosophy said they
were supposed to be doing. Furthermore, Dewey considered it incumbent on philosophy to adapt the method of inquiry to its own uses:
"The central question thus arises: What determines the selection of operations to be performed? There is but one answer:-the nature of the
problem to be dealt with."19
As a historical process, instrumental logic emphasizes specificity
over universality by taking as its focal point the problematic or unresolved situation. As Dewey points out, inquiry begins with a problematic situation-a real state of affairs, subject to question, testing, and
possible resolution. The inquirer goes about the business of organizing
facts and ideas according to their efficacy in resolving the problematic
situation into a "unified wh01e."~ODewey sees this as a creative process
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in which ideas "occur at first simply as suggestions. . . . The suggestion
becomes an idea when it is examined with reference to its functional
fitness, its capacity as a means of resolving the given ~ituation."~'
The logic of inquiry recognizes no universal prescriptive method and
emphasizes the interaction of the scientist and the environment
through the process of experimentation. Through experimentation,
theory and practice are linked together by necessity; one is meaningless
without the other. This functional integration characterizes the experimental method as Dewey saw it.22
It is this integration of theory and practice through the experimental method that makes instrumentalism both a theory of logic and a
principle of ethical analysis, and leads Dewey to eschew the normativepositive dichotomy.23For Dewey, the process of valuation is unavoidable in inquiry because inquiry is directed by reference to a problem
situation: "All conduct that is not simply either blindly impulsive or
mechanically routine seems to involve valuations. The problem of valuation is thus closely associated with the problem of the structure of
the sciences of human activities and human relation^."^^
Like Feyerabend, Dewey recognized that because science is a problemsolving activity, the selection of "facts" to be considered is determined
by the subjective awareness of a problem situation. "To see that a situation requires inquiry is the initial step of inquiry."2sHowever, whereas
the growth of knowledge tradition recognizes the subjective nature of
inquiry through selection, perception, and interpretation of "objective
facts," the neoinstitutionalist tradition attempts to develop a theory of
value to be used in evaluating and resolving the problem situation.
Social value theory is the cornerstone of the neoinstitutionalist perspective that is used in evaluating problem situations through the use
of instrumental logic. As such, the social value theory of neoinstitutionalist thought represents the explicit and full recognition of the normative aspects of inquiry:
What neoinstitutionalists wish to raise to full scholarly awareness is that
value premises permeate the whole of social inquiry. If inquiry is purposive-and it must be-it is value laden. Inquiry necessarily requires a continuing and successive exercise in the making of choices. To choose among
or between items compels recourse to a criterion on the basis of which
such choices can be made.26

The social value principle of neoinstitutionalist thought, drawing on
contributions of Veblen, Ayres, and Foster and synthesized by Tool,
proposes a criterion for social value that provides for "the continuity
of human life and the noninvidious recreation of community through
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the instrumental use of knowledge" and stresses four fundamental elements: the principle of continuity, instrumental effectiveness, recreatWhile some will argue that
ing community, and noninvidiou~ness.~~
the application of the principle of instrumental value theory to problem
situations does not lead to clear and obvious answers or resolutions,
the process of instrumental value theory represents an explicit attempt
to formulate not only a meaningful approach to inquiry, but an explicit
criterion by which to evaluate problem situations facing society.
Finally, like the growth of knowledge tradition, neoinstitutionalists
do not reject empirical analysis as such, but recognize the normative
aspects of empirical research. What neoinstitutional thought provides,,
however, is an explicit value theory to guide empirical analysis, for
"[tlheory building and empiricism uninformed by explicitly articulated
value premises are like loaded guns; we know they are very powerful
but we know not where to aim them."28
Conclusion

What is perhaps most important for the construction of a policy science is the ability of its practitioners to address existential problems of
concern to the public. Neoclassical economics fails in this regard and
much of the blame must be laid at the methodological doorstep. In its
attempt to emulate a defunct positivist methodology in the hope of appearing "scientific," economics has become a sterile game played for
the entertainment of economists.
One cannot help but question why neoclassical economics continues
to invoke positivism as the only acceptable methodology when positivism has been in decline for more than twenty years within the philosophy of science. The answer, we believe, is that the positivist tradition
has been instrumental in allowing orthodox economists to castigate
those alternative research programs that do not support the ideological
conclusions of neoclassicism. Thus, institutional economics has been
dismissed under the rubric of "science" because it does not conform in
toto to the rigorous demands of logical empiricism.
Our objective has been to argue that neoinstitutional thought can no
longer be rejected by appealing to the authority of philosophy of science
because recent developments within the philosophy of science have
discredited the foundations of the positivist tradition and have much
in common with the epistemological foundations of neoinstitutional
thought.
The importance of understanding the post-positivist aspects of neoinstitutional thought can hardly be overstated in that the status of neo-
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institutional thought as a valid research tradition depends in large part
on the recognition of the valid methodological aspects of this approach.
We would agree with Paul Diesing, "[tlhe one remaining useful route
for the neoclassicists is to recognize the very limited validity of their
perspective, and to treat it as a supplement to other, broader perspective~."?~
Such a perspective we find in neoinstitutionalism.
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